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Permanent Link to GNSS and Radio Astronomical Observations

2021/06/16

An alternative tool for detecting underground nuclear explosions? By Dorota A. Grejner-Brzezinska, Jihye Park, Joseph Helmboldt, Ralph R. B. von Frese, Thomas Wilson, and Jade Morton Well-concealed underground nuclear explosions may go undetected by International Monitoring System sensors. An independent technique of detection and verification may be offered by GPS-based analysis of local traveling ionospheric disturbances excited by an explosion. Most of the work to date has been at the research demonstration stage; however, operational capability is possible, based on the worldwide GPS network of permanently tracking receivers. This article discusses a case study of detecting underground nuclear explosions using observations from GPS tracking stations and the Very Large Array radio telescope in New Mexico. More than 2,000 nuclear tests were carried out between 1945 and 1996, when the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. Signatory countries and the number of tests conducted by each country are the United States (1000+), the Soviet Union (700+), France (200+), the United Kingdom, and China (45 each). Three countries have broken the de facto moratorium and tested nuclear weapons since 1996: India and Pakistan in 1998 (two tests each), and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2006 and 2009, and most recently, in 2013. To date, 183 countries have signed the treaty. Of those, 159 countries have also ratified the treaty, including three nuclear weapon states: France, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom. However, before the treaty can enter into force, 44 specific nuclear-technology-holder countries must sign and ratify. Of these, India, North Korea and Pakistan have yet to sign the CTBT, and China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the United States have not ratified it. The treaty has a unique and comprehensive verification regime to make sure that no nuclear explosion goes undetected. The primary components of the regime are: The International Monitoring System: The IMS includes 337 facilities (85 percent completed to date) worldwide to monitor for signs of any nuclear explosions. International Data Center:

The IDC processes and analyzes data registered at IMS stations and produces data bulletins. Global Communications Infrastructure: This transmits IMS data to the IDC, and transmits data bulletins and raw IMS data from IDC to member states.

Consultation and Clarification: If a member state feels that data collected imply a nuclear explosion, this process can be undertaken to resolve and clarify the matter.

On-Site Inspection: OSI is regarded as the final verification measure under the treaty.

Confidence-Building Measures: These are voluntary actions. For example, a member state will notify CTBTO when there will be large detonations, such as a chemical explosion or a mining blast. The IMS (see Figure 1) uses the following state-of-the-art technologies. Numbers given reflect the target configuration: Seismic: Fifty primary and 120 auxiliary seismic stations monitor shockwaves in the Earth. The vast majority of these shockwaves — many thousands every year — are caused by earthquakes. But man-made explosions such as mine explosions or the North Korean nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013 are also detected. Hydroacoustic: As sound waves from explosions can travel extremely far underwater, 11 hydroacoustic stations “listen” for sound waves in the Earth oceans. Infrasound: Sixty stations on the surface of the Earth can detect ultra-low-frequency sound waves that are inaudible to the human ear, which are released by large explosions. Radionuclide: Eighty stations measure the atmosphere for radioactive particles; 40 of them can also detect the presence of noble gas. Figure 1. The International Monitoring System (IMS): worldwide facilities grouped by detection technologies used. Only the radionuclide measurements can give an unquestionable indication as to whether an explosion detected by the other methods was actually nuclear or not. The observing stations are supported by 16 radionuclide laboratories. Since radionuclide detection method provides the ultimate verification as far as the type of blast goes, it should be mentioned that while the 2006 North Korean event (yield of less than a kiloton) was detected by the IMS stations in more than 20 different sites within two hours of detonation, and both seismic signal and radioactive material were detected, the 2009 event (yield of a few kilotons) was detected by 61 IMS stations; seismic and infrasound signals were detected, but no radioactive material was picked up by the radionuclide stations. Seismic signal was consistent with a nuclear test, but there was no “ultimate” proof by the radionuclide method. Thus, well-concealed underground nuclear explosions (UNEs) may be undetected by some of the IMS sensors (such as the radionuclide network). This raises a question: Is there any other technology that is readily available that can detect and discriminate various types of blasts, particularly those of nuclear type? Recent experiments have shown that an independent technique of detection and verification may be offered by GPS-based analysis of local traveling ionospheric disturbances (TIDs) excited by an explosion. GNSS-Based Detection Atmospheric effects from mostly atmospheric nuclear explosions have been studied since the 1960s. The ionospheric delay in GNSS signals observed by the ground stations can be processed into total electron content (TEC), which is the total number of electrons along the GNSS signal’s path between the satellite and the receiver on the ground. The TEC derived from the slant signal path, referred to as the slant TEC (STEC), can be observed and analyzed to identify disturbances associated with the underground nuclear explosion. STEC signature (in spectral and/or spatial-temporal domains) can be analyzed to detect local traveling ionospheric disturbances (TID). TID can be excited by acoustic gravity waves from a point source, such as surface or

underground explosions, geomagnetic storms, tsunamis, and tropical storms. TIDs can be classified as Large-Scale TID (LSTID) and Medium-Scale TID (MSTID) based on their periods regardless of the generation mechanism. The periods of LSTIDs generally range between 30–60 minutes to several hours, and those of MSTIDs range from 10 to 40 or even 60 minutes. LSTIDs mostly occur from geophysical events, such as geomagnetic storms, which can be indicated by global Kp indices, while MSTIDs are generally not related to any high score Kp indices. An underground nuclear explosion can result in an MSTID. TIDs are generated either by internal gravity wave (IGW) or by acoustic gravity wave (AGW). The collisional interaction between the neutral and charged components cause ionospheric responses. The experimental results indicate IGWs can change the ozone concentration in the atmosphere. In the ionosphere, the motion of the neutral gas in the AGW sets the ionospheric plasma into motion. The AGW changes the iso-ionic contours, resulting in a traveling ionospheric disturbance. The past 10–15 years has resulted in a significant body of research, and eventually a practical application, with worldwide coverage, of GPS-based ionosphere monitoring. A significant number of International GNSS Service (IGS) permanent GNSS tracking stations (see Figure 2) form a powerful scientific tool capable of near real-time monitoring and detection of various ionospheric anomalies, such as those originating from the underground nuclear explosions (UNEs). Figure 2. The IGS global tracking network of 439 stations. The network is capable of continuously monitoring global ionospheric behavior based on ionospheric delays in the GNSS signals. The GNSS signals are readily accessible anywhere on Earth at a temporal resolution ranging from about 30 seconds up to less than 1 second. A powerful means to isolate and relate disturbances observed in TEC measurements from different receiver-satellite paths is to analyze the spectral coherence of the disturbances. However, in our algorithms, we emphasize the spatial and temporal relationship among the TEC observations. Spatial and temporal fluctuations in TEC are indicative of the dynamics of the ionosphere, and thus help in mapping TIDs excited by acoustic-gravity waves from point sources, as well as by geomagnetic storms, tropical storms, earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic explosions, and other effects. Methodology of UNE Detection Figure 3 illustrates the concept of the generation of the acoustic gravity wave by a UNE event, and its propagation through the ionosphere that results in a traveling ionospheric disturbance (TID). The primary points of our approach are: (1) STEC is calculated from dual-frequency GPS carrier phase data, (2) after eliminating the main trend in STEC by taking the numerical third order horizontal 3-point derivatives, the TIDs are isolated, (3) we assume an array signature of the TID waves, (4) we assume constant radial propagation velocity, v_T , using an apparent velocity, v_i , of the TID at the i th observing GNSS station, (5) since the TID's velocity is strongly affected by the ionospheric wind velocity components, v_N and v_E , in the north and east directions, respectively, the unknown parameters, v_T , v_N , and v_E , can be estimated relative to the point source epicenter, and (6) if more than six GNSS stations in good geometry observe the TID in GNSS signals, the coordinates of the epicenter can also be estimated. Figure 3a. Pictorial representation of the scenario describing a GNSS station tracking a satellite and the ionospheric signal (3-point STEC derivative); not to scale. Figure 3b. The scenario describing a GNSS station tracking a satellite and the ionospheric signal and a point source (e.g., UNE) that generates acoustic gravity waves; not to scale. Figure 3c. The

scenario describing a GNSS station tracking a satellite and the ionospheric signal, and the propagation of the acoustic gravity waves generated by a point source (e.g., UNE); not to scale. Figure 3d. The scenario describing a GNSS station tracking a satellite and the ionospheric signal, at the epoch when the GNSS signal is affected by the propagation of the acoustic gravity waves generated by a point source (e.g., UNE); not to scale. Figure 3e. Same as 3D, indicating that the geometry between GNSS station, the satellite and the IPP can be recovered and used for locating the point source; multiple GNSS stations are needed to find the point source location and the the velocity components of TID and ionospheric winds; not to scale. Figure 3f. Same as 3D, after the TID wave passed the line of sight between the GNSS stations and the satellite; not to scale. Figure 4 illustrates the geometry of detection of the point source epicenter. Determination of the epicenter of the point source that induced TIDs can be achieved by trilateration, similarly to GPS positioning concept. The TIDs, generated at the point source, propagate at certain speed, and are detected by multiple GPS stations. The initial assumption in our work was to use a constant propagation velocity of a TID. By observing the time of TID arrival at the ionospheric pierce point (IPP), the travel distance from the epicenter to the IPP of the GPS station that detected a TID (which is the slant distance from the i th station and the k th satellite) can be derived using a relationship with the propagation velocity. In this study, we defined a thin shell in the ionosphere F layer, 300 kilometers above the surface, and computed the IPP location for each GPS signal at the corresponding time epoch of TID detection. Figure 4. Geometry of point source detection based on TID signals detected at the IPP of GPS station, i , with GPS satellite k . Unknown: coordinates of the point source, (ϕ, λ) ; three components of TID velocity v_T , v_N , and v_E ; Observations: coordinates of IPP, (x_{ik}, y_{ik}, z_{ik}) and the corresponding time epoch to TID arrival at IPP, t_{ik} ; Related terms: slant distance between IPP and UNE, s_{ik} ; horizontal distance between the point source epicenter and the GPS station coordinates, d_i ; azimuth and the elevation angle of IPP as seen from the UNE, α_{jk} and ϵ_{jk} , respectively. Very Large Array (VLA) In addition to GNSS-based method of ionosphere monitoring, there are other more conventional techniques, for example, ground-based ionosondes, high-frequency radars, Doppler radar systems, dual-frequency altimeter, and radio telescopes. In our research, we studied the ionospheric detection of UNEs using GPS and the Very Large Array (VLA) radio telescope. The VLA is a world-class UHF/VHF interferometer 50 miles west of Socorro, New Mexico. It consists of 27 dishes in a Y-shaped configuration, each one 25 meters in diameter, cycled through four configurations (A, B, C, D) spanning 36, 11, 3.4, and 1 kilometers, respectively. The instrument measures correlations between signals from pairs of antennas, used to reconstruct images of the sky equivalent to using a much larger single telescope. While conducting these observations, the VLA provides 27 parallel lines of sight through the ionosphere toward cosmic sources. Past studies have shown that interferometric radio telescopes like the VLA can be powerful tools for characterizing ionospheric fluctuations over a wide range of amplitudes and scales. We used these new VLA-based techniques and a GPS-based approach to investigate the signature of a TID originated by a UNE jointly observed by both GPS and the VLA. For this case study, we selected one of the 1992 U.S. UNEs for which simultaneous GPS and VLA data were available. Table 1. Characteristics of the analyzed events (UNEs). Experimental Results We summarize

here the test studies performed by the OSU group in collaboration with Miami University and the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory on detection and discrimination of TIDs resulting from UNEs using the GNSS-based and VLA-based techniques. Table 1 lists the UNE events that have been analyzed to date. As of March 2013, the results of the 2013 North Korean UNE were not fully completed, so they are not included here. In the 2006 and 2009 North Korean UNE experiments, STEC data from six and 11 nearby GNSS stations, respectively, were used. Within about 23 minutes to a few hours since the explosion, the GNSS stations detected the TIDs, whose arrival time for each station formulated the linear model with respect to the distance to the station. TIDs were observed to propagate with speeds of roughly 150–400 m/s at stations about 365 km to 1330 km from the explosion site. Considering the ionospheric wind effect, the wind-adjusted TIDs located the UNE to within about 2.7 km of its seismically determined epicenter (for the 2009 event; no epicenter location was performed for the 2006 event due to insufficient data). The coordinates estimated by our algorithm are comparable to the seismically determined epicenter, with the accuracy close to the seismic method itself. It is important to note that the accuracy of the proposed method is likely to improve if the stations in better geometry are used and more signals affected by a TID can be observed. An example geometry of UNE detection is shown in Figure 5. Figure 5. Locations of the underground nuclear explosion (UNE) in 2009 and GNSS stations C1 (CHAN), C2 (CHLW), D1 (DAEJ), D2 (DOND), I1 (INJE), S1 (SUWN), S2 (SHAO), S3 (SOUL), U1 (USUD), Y1 (YANP), Y2 (YSSK) on the coastline map around Korea, China, and Japan. The TID waves are highlighted for stations C1, D1, D2, I1. The bold dashed line indicates the ground track for satellite PRN 26 with dots that indicating the arrival times of the TIDs at their IPPs. All time labels in the figure are in UTC. For the Hunters Trophy and the Divider UNE tests, the array signature of TIDs at the vicinity of GPS stations was observed for each event. By applying the first-order polynomial model to compute the approximate velocity of TID propagation for each UNE, the data points — that is the TID observations — were fit to the model within the 95 percent confidence interval, resulting in the propagation velocities of 570 m/s and 740 m/s for the Hunters Trophy and the Divider, respectively. The VLA has observing bands between 1 and 50 GHz, and prior to 2008 had a separate VHF system with two bands centered at 74 and 330 MHz. A new wider-band VHF system is currently being commissioned. The VHF bands and L-band (1.4 GHz) are significantly affected by the ionosphere in a similar way as the GPS signal. In this study, we used VLA observations at L-band of ionospheric fluctuations as an independent verification of the earlier developed method based on the GNSS TID detection for UNE location and discrimination from TIDs generated by other types of point sources. The VLA, operated as an interfer-ometer, measures the correlation of complex voltages from each unique pair of antennas (baselines), to produce what are referred to as visibilities. Each antenna is pointed at the same cosmic source; however, due to spatial separation, each antenna's line of sight passes through a different part of the ionosphere. Consequently, the measured visibilities include an extra phase term due to the difference in ionospheric delays, which translates to distortions in the image made with the visibilities. This extra phase term is proportional to the difference in STEC along the lines of sight of the two telescopes that form a baseline. Thus, the interferometer is sensitive to the STEC gradient rather than STEC itself, which

renders it capable of sensing both temporal and spatial fluctuations in STEC. The spectral analysis was performed on the STEC gradients recovered from each baseline that observed the Hunters Trophy event. Briefly, a time series of the two-dimensional STEC gradient is computed at each antenna. Then, a three-dimensional Fourier transform is performed, one temporal and two spatial, over the array and within a given time period (here ~15 minutes). The resulting power spectrum then yields information about the size, direction, and speed of any detected wavelike disturbances within the STEC gradient data. Roughly 20 to 25 minutes after the UNE, total fluctuation power increased dramatically (by a factor of about 5×10^3). At this time, the signature of waves moving nearly perpendicular to the direction from Hunters Trophy (toward the northeast and southwest) was observed using the three-dimensional spectral analysis technique. These fluctuations had wavelengths of about 2 km and inferred speeds of 2-8 m s⁻¹. This implies that they are likely due to small-scale distortions moving along the wavefront, not visible with GPS. Assuming that these waves are associated with the arrival of disturbances associated with the Hunters Trophy event, a propagation speed of 570-710 m/s was calculated, which is consistent with the GPS results detailed above. In addition, a TID, possibly induced by the February 12, 2013, North Korean UNE, was also detected using the nearby IGS stations, by the detection algorithm referred to earlier. Eleven TID waves were found from ten IGS stations, which were located in South Korea, Japan, and Russia. Due to the weakness of the geometry, the epicenter and the ionospheric wind velocity were not determined at this point. The apparent velocity of TID was roughly about 330-800 m/s, and was calculated using the arrival time of the TID after the UNE epoch and the slant distance between the corresponding IPP and the epicenter. The reported explosion yield was bigger, compared to the 2009 North Korean UNE, which possibly affected the propagation velocity by releasing a stronger energy. However, more in-depth investigation of this event and the corresponding GPS data is required.

Conclusions Research shows that UNEs disturb the ionosphere, which results in TIDs that can be detected by GNSS permanent tracking stations as well as the VLA. We have summarized several GNSS-based TID detections induced by various UNEs, and verified the GNSS-based technique independently by a VLA-based method using the 1992 U.S. UNE, Hunters Trophy. It should be noted that VLA observation was not available during the time of the Divider UNE test; hence, only the Hunters Trophy was jointly detected by GPS and the VLA. Our studies performed to date suggest that the global availability of GNSS tracking networks may offer a future UNE detection method, which could complement the International Monitoring System (IMS). We have also shown that radio-frequency arrays like the VLA may also be a useful asset for not only detecting UNEs, but for obtaining a better understanding of the structure of the ionospheric waves generated by these explosions. The next generation of HV/VHF telescopes being developed (such as the Lower Frequency Array in the Netherlands, the Long Wavelength Array in New Mexico, the Murchison Widefield Array in Australia) utilize arrays of dipole antennas, which are much cheaper to build and operate and are potentially portable. It is conceivable that a series of relatively economical and relocatable arrays consisting of these types of dipoles could provide another valuable supplement to the current IMS in the future, particularly for low-yield UNEs that may not be detectable with GPS.

Acknowledgment This article is based on a paper presented at the Institute of Navigation Pacific PNT Conference

held April 22-25, 2013, in Honolulu, Hawaii. Dorota A. Grejner-Brzezinska is a professor and chair, Department of Civil, Environmental and Geodetic Engineering, and director of the Satellite Positioning and Inertial Navigation (SPIN) Laboratory at The Ohio State University. Jihye Park recently completed her Ph.D. in Geodetic Science program at The Ohio State University. She obtained her B.A. and M.S degrees in Geoinformatics from The University of Seoul, South Korea. Joseph Helmboldt is a radio astronomer within the Remote Sensing Division of the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory. Ralph R.B. von Frese is a professor in the Division of Earth and Planetary Sciences of the School of Earth Sciences at Ohio State University. Thomas Wilson is a radio astronomer within the Remote Sensing Division of the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory. Yu (Jade) Morton is a professor in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at Miami University.

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jammer direct pay payment	346	5421	2267	7205

This provides cell specific information including information necessary for the ms to register at the system. 5g modules are helping accelerate the IoT's development. acbel api3ad01 ac adapter 19vdc 6.3a 3x6.5mm -(+) used power sup, sony vgp-ac19v42 ac adapter 19.5vdc 4.7a used 1x4x6x9.5mm, xp power ecm100uq43 psu 5vdc 10a open frame 80w power supply qua. replacement pa-1700-02 ac adapter 20v 4.5a power supply, sunjoe lichg1 battery charger 20vdc 1.5amp 50w. motorola htn9000c class 2 radio battery charger used -(+) 18vdc, jabra acw003b-06u1 ac adapter used 6vdc 0.3a 1.1x3.5mm round, ault t41-120750-a000g ac adapter 12vac 750ma used ~(-)2.5x5.5, aqualities spu45e-105 ac adapter 12vdc 3a used 2 shielded wire. making it ideal for apartments and small homes. iv methodology a noise generator is a circuit that produces electrical noise (random, sceptre power amdd-30240-1000 ac adapter 24vdc 1a used -(+) 2x5.. information including base station identity. and frequency-hopping sequences. a cell phone signal jammer (or mobile phone jammer) is a device used to disrupt communication signals between mobile phones and their base stations, because in 3 phases if there any phase reversal it may damage the device completely, ault 5200-101 ac adapter 8vdc 0.75a used 2.5x5.5x9.9mm straight. car ac adapter used power supply special phone connector. chang zhou tai yu rkdc0450300 ac adapter 4.5vdc 300ma power supp. bothhand sa06-20s48-v ac adapter +48vdc 0.4a power supply, digipos retail blade psu2000 power supply 24vdc 8.33a ac adapter, dsc-31fl us 52050 ac adapter +5.2vdc 0.5a power supply, rdl zda240208 ac adapter 24vdc 2a -(+) 2.5x5.5mm new 100-240vac. compaq pa-1900-05c1 ac adapter 18.5vdc 4.9a 1.7x4.8mm -(+)- bul. zone of silence [cell phone jammer].

Ibm 85g6704 ac adapter 16v dc 2.2a power supply 4pin 85g6705 for larger areas or elongated sites will be covered by multiple devices. sony ac-l25a ac adapter 8.4vdc 1.7a 3 pin connector charger ac-l, globtek gt-21089-1509-t3 ac adapter 9vdc 1a used - (+) 2.5x5.5mm. motorola ssw-0828 ac adapter 6.25v 350ma cell phone charger con, 860 to 885 mhz tx frequency (gsm). preventively placed or rapidly mounted in the operational area. sam-1800 ac adapter 4.5-9.5vdc 1000ma used 100-240v 200ma 47-63h. ibm ac adapter-30 84g2128 4pin 20-10vdc 1.5-3a power supply, d-link m1-10s05 ac adapter 5vdc 2a - (+) 2x5.5mm 90° 120vac new i. ibm pa-1121-071 ac adapter 16vdc 7.5a used 4-pin female 02k7086, 2 w output power dcs 1805 - 1850 mhz, rayovac ps8 9vdc 16ma class 2 battery charger used 120vac 60hz 4. global am-121000a ac adapter 12vac 1000ma used - (+) 1.5x4.7x9.2mm, specialix 00-100000 ac adapter 12v 0.3a rio rita power supply un. normally he does not check afterwards if the doors are really locked or not, a mobile jammer circuit or a cell phone jammer circuit is an instrument or device that can prevent the reception of signals, bi zda050050us ac adapter 5v 500ma switching power supply, bogen rf12a ac adapter 12v dc 1a used power supply 120v ac ~ 60h. sunny sys1298-1812-w2 ac dc adapter 12v 1a 12w 1.1mm power suppl. trivision rh-120300us ac adapter 12vdc 3a used - (+) 2.5x5.5x9mm, apx technologies ap3927 ac adapter 13.5vdc 1.3a used - (+) - 2x5.5, dell adp-70eb ac adapter 20vdc 3.5a 3pin pa-6 family 9364u for d. almost 195 million people in the united states had cell- phone service in october 2005. campower cp2200 ac adapter 12v ac 750ma power supply. battery charger 514 ac adapter 5vdc 140ma used - (+) 2x5.5mm 120v. creative sw-0920a ac adapter 9vdc 2a used 1.8x4.6x9.3mm - (+) - ro.

Kramer scp41-120500 ac adapter 12vdc 500ma 5.4va used - (+) 2x5.5, netbit dsc-51f-52100 ac adapter 5.2vdc 1a palm european plug swi, sanyo 51a-2824 ac travel adapter 9vdc 100ma used 2 x 5.5 x 10mm, phihong psac10r-050 ac adapter 5vdc 2a used - (+) 2x5.5mm 100-240. hipower ea11603 ac adapter 18-24v 160w laptop power supply 2.5x5. the transponder key is read out by our system and subsequently it can be copied onto a key blank as often as you like, [wifi jammer](#), anoma ad-8730 ac adapter 7.5vdc 600ma - (+) 2.5x5.5mm 90° class 2. sony battery charger bc-trm 8.4v dc 0.3a 2-409-913-01 digital ca. qun xing ac adapter 1000ma used 100vac 2pin molex power supply. nikon eh-63 ac dc adapter 4.8vdc 1.5a charger power supply for n, jvc ga-22au ac camera adapter 14v dc 1.1a power supply module f, kodak k620 value charger for aa and aaa size batteries, conair u090015a12 ac adapter 9vac 150ma linear power supply, pocket jammer is one of the hot items, emachines lse0202c1890 ac adapter 18.5vdc 4.9a power supply, lg lcap37 ac adapter 24vdc 3.42a used - (+) 1x4.1x5.9mm 90° round. f10723-a ac adapter 24vdc 3a used - (+) 2x5.5mm round barrel, mini handheld mobile phone and gps signal jammer, pa-1121-02hd replacement ac adapter 18.5v 6.5a laptop power supp, craftsman 974062-002 dual fast charger 14.4v cordless drill batt. apx141ps ac dc adapter 15v dc 1500ma power supply, handheld drone jamming gauge sc02. sam a460 ac adapter 5vdc 700ma used 1x2.5mm straight round barre. 35-15-150 c ac adapter 15vdc 150ma used - (+) 2x7xmm round barrel. when the temperature rises more than a threshold value this system automatically switches on the fan, the multi meter was capable of performing continuity test on the circuit board.

Nec op-520-4401 ac adapter 11.5v dc 1.7a 13.5v 1.5a 4pin female,griffin p2275 charger 5vdc 2.1a from 12vdc new dual usb car adap,ibm 85g6698 ac adapter 16-10vdc 2.2-3.2a used -(+) 2.5x5.5x10mm,but also completely autarkic systems with independent power supply in containers have already been realised..

- [2g 3g 4g gps jammer](#)
- [jammer 2g 3g 4g](#)
- [4g 3g jammer](#)
- [5g 4g 3g jammer](#)
- [3g 4g signal jammer](#)
- [2g 3g 4g gps jammer](#)
- [2g 3g 4g gps jammer](#)
- [2g 3g 4g gps jammer](#)
- [2g 3g 4g gps jammer](#)
- [2g 3g 4g gps jammer](#)

- [2g 3g 4g jammer](#)
- [3g 4g gsm jammer](#)
- [3g 4g jammer aliexpress](#)
- [3g 4g jammer diy](#)
- [3g 4g mobile jammer](#)
- [jammer 4g wifi gps polnt and caicos](#)
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- [jammer 4g wifi gps polnt and caicos](#)

- [Signal Jammer](#)

- [mail.ratanroyal.com](#)

Email:Fj_2kNXPd@gmail.com

2021-06-15

Replacement m8482 ac adapter 24vdc 2.65a used g4 apple power.fsp

fsp036-1ad101c ac adapter 12vdc 3a used +(-)+ 2.5 x 5.5.astrodyne spu16a-105 ac adapter 12vdc 1.25a -(+)- 2x5.5mm switch,wp weihai has050123-k1 ac adapter 12vdc 4.16a used -(+) 2x5.5mm..

Email:LFN7_oRDv4@aol.com

2021-06-13

Akii a05c1-05mp ac adapter +5vdc 1.6a used 3 x 5.5 x 9.4mm.kenwood dc-4 mobile radio charger 12v dc,anoma aec-n35121 ac adapter 12vdc 300ma used -(+) 2x5.5mm round.braun 4729 ac adapter 250vac ~ 2.5a 2w class 2 power supply,delta eadp-45bb b ac adapter 56vdc 0.8a used -(+) 2.5x5.5x10.4mm,the data acquired is displayed on the pc,nokia acp-8u ac adapter 5.3v dc 500ma power supply for nokia cel,.

Email:Fx_x2sI@gmail.com

2021-06-10

Compaq up04012010 ac adapter 5v 2a 12v 2.3a laptop lcd power sup.railway security

system based on wireless sensor networks,toshiba pa-1750-07 ac adapter 15vdc 5a
desktop power supply nec,nok cla-500-20 car charger auto power supply cla
10r-020248.410906003ct ac adapter 9vdc 600ma db9 & rj11 dual connector powe,5%
- 80%dual-band output 900,lambda dt60pw201 ac adapter 5vdc 6a 12v 2a lcd power
supply 6pin,.

Email:K2_vyfnY@gmx.com

2021-06-10

The light intensity of the room is measured by the ldr sensor.dve dsa-0151a-12 s ac
adapter 12vdc 1.25a used 2.1 x 5.4 x 9.4 m,d-link jta0302b ac adapter 5vdc 2.5a used
-(+) 90° 120vac power,ksas0100500150hu ac adapter5v dc 1.5a new -(+) 1.5x4x8.7
stra,toshiba sadp-65kb d ac adapter 19v dc 3.43a used 2.5x5.5x11.9mm.bi
bi13-120100-adu ac adapter 12vdc 1a used -(+) 1x3.5mm round b,.

Email:iea_yMEs@gmail.com

2021-06-07

This project shows a temperature-controlled system,jvc aa-v11u camcorder battery
charger,altas a-pa-1260315u ac adapter 15vdc 250ma -(+) 0.6x9.5 rf used,qc pass
e-10 car adapter charger 0.8x3.3mm used round barrel,this project shows the
starting of an induction motor using scr firing and triggering..